Abstract-In this paper we discuss how to construct a barrier certificate for a control affine system subject to actuator constraints and motivate this discussion by examining collision avoidance for fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In particular, the theoretical development in this paper is used to create a barrier certificate that ensures that two UAVs will not collide for all future times assuming the vehicles start in a safe starting configuration. We then extend this development by discussing how to ensure that multiple safety constraints are simultaneously satisfied in a decentralized manner (e.g., ensure robot distances are above some threshold for all pairwise combinations of UAVs for all future times) while ensuring output actuator commands are within specified limits. We validate the theoretical developments of this paper in the simulator SCRIMMAGE with a simulation of 20 UAVs that maintain safe distances from each other even though their nominal paths would otherwise cause a collision.
I. INTRODUCTION
A S low-cost, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) find civilian uses, the low-altitude airspace is increasingly congested, leading to large-scale UAV operation limitations including concerns for privacy, the environment, national security, and safe-flight validation [1] . A key challenge for safe-flight validation in congested environments is ensuring collision avoidance while enabling vehicles to accomplish their designed missions. Thus, in this paper we propose a decentralized algorithm that minimally alters a vehicle's nominal control signal (designed, for example, to deliver goods or for crop monitoring) while still ensuring safe operations.
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A central idea of this paper is how to leverage evasive maneuvers to guarantee safe operations. Trajectory generation was analyzed in [14] where a nonlinear program is developed to find a safe reference trajectory constructed from polynomials. In [15] and [16] , the authors discuss trajectory generation using a RRT with dynamics constraints provided by dubins paths and a waypoint generation algorithm, respectively.
Similar to evasive maneuvers, traffic rules [17] , [18] are a method for encoding hybrid behaviors that can include collision avoidance trajectories. In [17] , the authors show that a two vehicle system with limited sensing range can avoid collisions while reaching position goals. While in general this may result in conservative behaviors, they demonstrate in simulation that the decentralized algorithm continues to allow vehicles to reach their target configuration while avoiding collisions for as many as 70 vehicles.
Motivated by the importance of formal guarantees of collision avoidance that are computationally feasible and minimally arXiv:1906.03771v1 [cs.RO] 10 Jun 2019 invasive we discuss in this paper how to apply barrier certificates (e.g., [19] , [20] ) to the UAV collision avoidance problem, where the system is subject to actuator constraints, nonlinear dynamics, and nonlinear safety constraints. Barrier certificates provide guarantees that a system will stay safe (i.e., vehicles will maintain safe distances from each other) for all future times. Further, under some assumptions detailed in Section II, barrier certificates can be formulated as a Quadratic Program (QP) for fast online computation of safe control inputs [20] . Given such safety guarantees, barrier certificates have been applied to a set of problems including collision avoidance for autonomous agents ( [21] , [22] ), bipedal robots ( [23] , [24] ), adaptive cruise control and lane following ( [25] , [20] , [26] , [27] ), and in mobile communication networks [28] .
However, barrier certificates rely on being able to find a function for safety set invariance to be guaranteed. For systems like a fixed wing UAV with actuator constraints, nonlinear dynamics, and nonlinear safety constraints, generating such a function can be difficult. In this respect they are similar to Lyapunov functions. They provide guarantees when a system designer can find appropriate functions but they may be difficult to construct.
Nevertheless, there are a variety of approaches to finding a barrier certificate given a system and safety constraints. One approach discussed for instance in ( [25] , [29] , [19] , [30] ), uses a sum of squares decomposition [31] . In this approach an initially conservative estimate for a barrier certificate is found and the associated safe set is iteratively enlarged. Iterative approaches have also been developed when the system has relative degree greater than one. The conditions for calculating a safe control input for higher order systems are given in [32] . In [24] , a backstepping approach is developed that ensures a control barrier certificate can be constructed and a similar approach is discussed in [33] . In both cases, the barrier function construction requires that the control input is not subject to actuator constraints.
System-specific arguments have also been applied to the development of a barrier certificate. For instance, geometric insights are exploited in [23] , where the authors develop a barrier function for precise foot placement by ensuring that foot is within the intersection of two circles. Similarly, in [21] , [22] , the authors develop a barrier function that ensures a circle and ellipsoid, respectively, around each robot will not overlap in order to ensure there will be no collisions for double integrator and quadrotor robots, respectively. Barrier certificates have also been developed for unicycle dynamics in [27] , where the dynamics are simplified by considering a point slightly in front of the vehicle.
This paper is concerned with ensuring that fixed-wing UAVs maintain safe distances from each other. Because collision avoidance can be viewed as a constraint for each pairwise combination of vehicles [28] , [34] , we briefly review how barrier certificates have been applied to systems with multiple constraints. A contract-based approach is presented in [25] . A sum of squares decomposition is presented in [30] where additional safety constraints map to additional constraints in the optimization problem. In [33] , necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence of a control input that satisfies multiple barrier certificate constraints. The approach generalizes to high order and time-varying systems but requires that actuator constraints be unbounded. Barrier certificate composition has also been addressed in [25] , [28] , and [34] . In [25] , the authors partition the state space into regions for which a single barrier certificate is active in each component of the partition. In [28] and [34] non-smooth barrier functions are discussed, where the result allows for combining barrier certificates using boolean primitives. One drawback of the boolean composition approaches is that it is not guaranteed that the composition of barrier functions will result in a barrier function.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, it generalizes a method discussed for instance in [21] , [22] for constructing a barrier certificate that can be used to make safety guarantees for a system. Second, it shows how to ensure that multiple safety constraints can be satisfied simultaneously when using this constructive method. Third, it presents a decentralized algorithm for ensuring safety in the context of multi-agent systems. Fourth, it shows how to apply the above theory to a scenario involving fixed wing UAVs where vehicles must ensure minimum separation distances are maintained at all times. This paper expands on the conference version [35] which did not consider multiple constraints and only considered the centralized case. It also expands on the simulation study presented in [35] by considering a scenario with 20 vehicles to demonstrate that all pairwise distances between vehicles can be kept above a minimum safety distances throughout a scenario. This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses background information for barrier certificates. Section III discusses a general method for constructing a barrier certificate and shows how to apply it to fixed wing collision avoidance. Section IV generalizes the results of Section III by showing how to satisfy multiple constraints simultaneously. Section V relaxes the amount of information required to share between vehicles while still guaranteeing safety. Section VI presents a simulation verification of the approach. Section VII concludes.
II. BARRIER CERTIFICATES BACKGROUND
We summarize the necessary background for barrier certificates here. See [20] for a more complete discussion. Consider a control affine systeṁ
where f and g are locally Lipschitz, x ∈ R n , u ∈ U ⊆ R m , and solutions are forward complete, meaning the system has a unique solution for all time greater than or equal to 0 given a starting condition x(0).
To use this formation for a set of vehicles, suppose there are k vehicles with state x i and
. . .
In this paper we model the individual vehicles with state x i = p i,x p i,y θ i T and u i = v i ω i T with dynamicṡ
where
n an open set, and denote the superlevel set
In the above definition L f h and L g h denote the Lie derivatives. The admissible control space is defined as
In [20] it is also shown how to calculate u(x) ∈ K h (x) using a Quadratic Program (QP) to support fast, online calculations. In particular, assume there is some nominalû available that is designed to achieve some performance goal (e.g., path-following) that has not necessarily been designed to satisfy safety constraints. Additionally, we assume U can be expressed as the set of all u satisfying the linear inequality Au ≥ b. The safe control input can then be calculated using a QP as follows
Note that by property (4), when h is a ZCBF, (6) is guaranteed to be feasible when x ∈ D.
III. BARRIER CERTIFICATE CONSTRUCTION

A. Motivating Example
In this section we discuss some difficulties with applying barrier certificates to the fixed-wing collision avoidance problem via a concrete example. Consider a candidate ZCBF, h, that encodes a collision avoidance safety constraint
2 is the squared distance between vehicles 1 and 2 and D s is a minimum safety distance.
One common approach for systems with relative degree equal to one is to use the safety constraint directly as a ZCBF. However, when actuator constraints are present, the safety constraint may fail to be a valid ZCBF. To show why h defined in (7) is not a ZCBF, we present an example where x ∈ C h but h does not satisfy (4) . Let
T and
The problem with this candidate ZCBF is that it does not account for the fact that by the time the vehicles are close to colliding, it may be too late to avoid each other due to the limited turning radius and positive minimum velocity.
B. Constructing a Barrier Certificate via Evading Maneuvers
In order to overcome the difficulties demonstrated in the example of Section III-A, we introduce a method to construct a ZCBF from a safety constraint. Let ρ : D → R be a safety function that represents the safety objective we want to satisfy at all times so that ρ(x) ≥ 0 indicates that the system is safe. In the example from Section III-A for vehicles i and j,
Second, let γ : D → U be a nominal evading maneuver. Section III-C discusses specific examples of γ for the UAV collision avoidance problem. For now, assuming γ has been selected, let
be a candidate ZCBF wherex andẋ are given bŷ
This choice of a candidate ZCBF h is motivated by the fact that in (9), h measures how close the state will get to the boundary of the safe set assuming γ is used as the control input for all future time. We first establish sufficient conditions under which h is differentiable. To do this, we assume that h has a unique x minimizer. In other words, there is a unique x min ∈ D such that h(x) = ρ(x min ) where x min =x(t + τ ) for at least one τ ≥ 0. See the appendix for the proof.
Theorem 2.
Assume h is defined in (9) and is constructed from ρ : D → R and γ : D → U . Let h have a unique x minimizer for all x ∈ D, ρ be continuously differentiable, and γ be such that f (x) + g(x)γ(x) is continuously differentiable. Then h is continuously differentiable.
Remark 1. For cases where the candidate ZCBF h has multiple x minima at x min1 , . . . , x min l for some integer l > 1, the derivative will not necessarily be smooth. See [34] for handling this case.
In Section III-A we saw that we could not use the Euclidean distance for a ZCBF because when a candidate ZCBF h is defined as in (7), K h could be empty even though h was nonnegative. In other words, h could be non-negative but there was no control input available to keep the system safe. With h defined in (9), this problem is alleviated. (9) is continuously differentiable and γ is locally Lipschitz. Then h is a ZCBF on C h . If in addition, L g h(x) is non-zero for some x ∈ ∂C h and γ maps to values in the interior of U , then h is a ZCBF on a set D where C h ⊂ D.
Theorem 3. Assume h in
Proof. We start by assuming x ∈ C h and show that h satisfies (4) . Because
is the derivative along the trajectory ofx. In other words,
Consider the term inside the parenthesis in (12), namely
and notice that it is the subtraction of an infimum of the same function ρ evaluated on two different intervals. Further, note that the first interval is a subset of the second interval since a approaches 0 from above. Thus, the term inside the parenthesis on the right hand side of (12) 
Now assume that L g h(x) is non-zero for some x ∈ ∂C h and γ maps to values in the interior of U . We will show that there is a set D that is a strict superset of C h for which (4) holds. Let x ∈ ∂C h be such that L g h(x) is non-zero and B(x, δ) be a ball of radius δ > 0 such that for all z ∈ B( Fig. 1 : A geometric view of why h defined in (9) can be a barrier function. Here U is shown as a closed convex polytope satisfying U = {u : Au ≥ b} and K h is the half-space. The constraint (4) implies that the intersection of U and K h is nonempty. When h is defined in (9) , it satisfies this constraint by ensuring that γ(x) ∈ U and γ(x) ∈ K h for all x ∈ C h . the direction of L g h(z). Note that such a vector exists because γ maps to the interior of U . Also note that
implies that an α must also be found to specify a valid ZCBF. The above result holds for all α, resolving this ambiguity.
Remark 3. The intuitive reason why h is a ZCBF is that whenever h(x) is non-negative, we have by definition a control input γ available to keep the system safe. A geometric view is presented in Figure 1 . Note that γ is not the output of the Quadratic Program (6) . Instead, the role of γ is to allow h to be evaluated via (9) .
C. Deriving a Barrier Certificate for UAV Collision Avoidance
We now consider how to calculate h defined in (9) for the UAV collision avoidance problem. From Theorem 3 the only restriction on γ and ρ is that γ is locally Lipschitz and that h is continuously differentiable so there is some flexibility in choosing γ and ρ. In this section we discuss two cases where we can choose γ and ρ so that h can be calculated in closed form. Let the initial state for vehicle i (i = 1, 2) be given by p i,x0 p i,y0 θ i,0 T .
Example 1.
In the first case, let
where δ > 0 is introduced to (8) so that h will be continuously differentiable. Let
with σ = 0, ω = 0. In other words, γ turn is defined by the same turn rate for both vehicles but possibly different translational velocities. Letting
s . By expanding the square terms and applying two trigonometric identities, 1 we get 
the same reasoning yields h(x) = √ A 1 − A 2 − D s for ρ defined in (15) . Note that A 1 − A 2 ≥ 0 provided that the vehicles do not get more than 2δ from each other along the trajectory defined by (10) using γ turn in (14).
Example 2. For a second case where we can solve (9) in closed form, let ρ be given in (8) and
where v 1 = v 2 . In other words, γ straight uses a 0 turn rate while allowing the vehicles to have different speeds. In this case we have
s , which is quadratic in t so the minimum can be calculated in closed form. 1 The identities are sin 2 (α) + cos 2 (α) = 1 and cos(α − β) = cos(α) cos(β) + sin(α) sin(β).
D. Simulation of Two Vehicles
We demonstrate the theoretical development of this section in simulation using SCRIMMAGE [36] . SCRIMMAGE is a multi-agent simulator designed to scale to high numbers of vehicles and includes a plugin-interface that makes it easy to experiment with different motion models and controllers without having to change code. This makes it simple to swap out nominal controllers and vary the fidelity of fixed-wing UAVs from the unicycle dynamics in (2) 
where ψ is an additional offset so that vehicles are not necessarily starting with orientation pointing at the origin. The goal position for vehicle i is on the other side of the origin:
This setup is selected so that the vehicles are on a collision course. The nominal controller is that described in [37] with constant λ = 1. Additionally, we let v min = 15 meters/second, v max = 25 meters/second, ω max = 13 degrees/second, D s = 5 meters, and δ = 0.01 meters 2 . ω max is chosen to be consistent with a constant rate turn [38] with a 30 degree bank with a speed of v max . Each vehicle evaluates (6) at each timestep where we use OSCP [39] to evaluate the QP. We investigate the performance of the vehicles when h defined in (9) is constructed from γ turn in (14) and γ straight (17) , respectively, where γ turn = 1.1v ω v ω T , γ straight = 1.1v 0 v 0 T , and v = 0.9v min + 0.1v max and ω = 0.9ω max . For the scenario with γ turn , we let ψ = 0 so that the vehicles start with orientation pointing at the origin. For the scenario with γ straight , we let ψ = 2
• because if the vehicles pointed at the origin they would not start in the safe set. Additionally, for the γ turn case we use ρ in (15) . Similarly, for the γ straight case we use ρ(x) = d 1,2 (x) − D s . Details of the distance between the vehicles and control signals are shown in Figure 2 . Note that the resulting trajectory can be different depending on which γ is used as shown in Figure 2d . Nevertheless, in both cases the vehicles are able to maintain safe distances from each other and satisfy actuator constraints throughout the simulation regardless of which γ is used to construct a h.
IV. COMPOSITION OF MULTIPLE SAFETY CONSTRAINTS
A. Motivating Example
Although the constructive method introduced in (9) can produce a barrier certificate in the presence of actuator constraints that ensures two vehicles do not collide, the formulation does not extend immediately to collision avoidance for systems with more than two vehicles. To see this, we present a specific example where three UAVs with a collision avoidance safety objective cannot use the results from Section III-B to ensure safety. A plot of this scenario is shown in Figure 3 . We index the vehicles by i = 1, 2, 3. To ensure collision-free trajectories, and considering the safety function defined in (13), three pairwise constraints must be nonnegative at all times:
s . We now apply these results of Section III to these constraints and for simplicity, let δ be approximately 0. For each constraint, define an arbitrarily chosen nominal evading maneuver
In other words, γ 1 encodes an evasive maneuver where all the vehicles turn right while γ 2 and γ 3 encode a maneuver where all the vehicles turn left. We note that h j (j = 1, . . . , 3) defined in (9) and constructed from ρ j and γ j are ZCBFs. In this example we let v min = 1, v max = 2, ω max = 1, and D s = 0.5 so that the vehicles follow a circular trajectory with radius r = 1 when applying v min and ω max . Assume now that the vehicles have the following initial states
where ψ = arccos Ds/2+2r 2r+Ds
. Then h 1 (x) = h 2 (x) = h 3 (x) = 0 and the barrier constraints in (4) for h 1 (x) and
Although h 1 and h 2 are ZCBFs, these two constraints cannot be simultaneously satisfied for v i ∈ [v min , v max ] and |ω i | ≤ ω max . In particular, after substituting the minimum velocity v 1 = v 2 = 1, the first equation dictates that ω 1 + ω 2 ≤ −2 (i.e., vehicles 1 and 2 must turn right). Similarly, the second equation dictates that vehicle 1 and 3 must turn left. The problem with this scenario is that vehicle 1 cannot simultaneously execute both nominal evading maneuvers (i.e., turn both left and right at the same time). To solve this problem, we will make sure that the evasive maneuver applied by a vehicle is the same for every barrier certificate. A geometric view of the general problem and its solution are shown in Figure 4 .
B. Problem Statement For Satisfying Multiple Objectives
In order to solve the issues arising when vehicles have to simultaneously respect multiple constraints, we now extend the use of the constructive technique introduced in (9) . Suppose there are q constraints ρ j : D → R (j = 1, . . . , q) that must be greater than or equal to 0 at all times. For the k agents with pairwise constraints q = k(k − 1)/2. We assume that for each constraint j = 1, . . . , q, a locally Lipschitz nominal evading maneuver γ j has been selected using the framework in (9) . An example for fixed-wing UAVs with collision avoidance safety constraints is given in (14) . We assume h j is constructed according to (9) and is continuously differentiable so that h j is a ZCBF for j = 1, . . . , q. Denote the overall safe set and overall admissible control space as
Lemma 1. Suppose h j is a ZCBF for j = 1, . . . , q. Then any Lipschitz continuous controller u : C h → U such that u(x) ∈ K ∩ (x) will render the set C ∩ forward invariant.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ C ∩ . Then x ∈ C h j for j = 1, . . . , q. Because u ∈ K ∩ , u ∈ K h j for j = 1, . . . , q, so it follows from Theorem 1 that C h j is forward invariant. In other words, if x(0) ∈ C ∩ then x(t) ∈ C h j for all t ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , q. (9) is constructed to design a certificate so that vehicles 1 and 2 stay safe. Here γ 1 encodes an evasive maneuver where vehicles 1 and 2 turn right. Further, vehicles 1 and 2 are placed so that turning right is the only available control input to keep the system safe. In (b), a similar setup is shown for vehicles 1 and 3 where h 2 has been constructed from γ 2 which enodes an evasive manuever where vehicles 1 and 3 turn left and vehicles 1 and 3 placed so they are only able to turn left to stay safe. In (c), vehicle 1 cannot turn both right and left to avoid vehicles 2 and 3, respectively. Although vehicle 1 can avoid them individually, it cannot avoid them both simultaneously.û Fig. 4 : A geometric view of why having a set of individual barrier certificates does not guarantee that a control input u exists to satisfy each associated constraint and how the shared evading maneuver assumption resolves this issue. In (a), multiple barrier function constraints are shown as half-spaces. To satisfy Lemma 1, a u must be selected that is in the intersection of K h 1 , K h 2 , and U . In (b), although there exists a u that is in the intersection of U and K h 1 as well as U and K h 2 , as guaranteed by the fact that h 1 and h 2 are ZCBFs, there does not exist a u that is in the intersection of U , K h 1 , and K h 2 . This case corresponds to the specific scenario for the three vehicle collision avoidance problem in Fig. 3c . In (c), the problem is resolved by the shared evading maneuver because γ s (x) satisfies each constraint.
Therefore if x(0) ∈ C ∩ then x(t) ∈ C ∩ for all t ≥ 0 so C ∩ is forward invariant.
C. The Shared Nominal Evading Maneuver Assumption
Section IV-A showed an example where K ∩ could be empty for some x ∈ C ∩ . As a result, the assumptions of Lemma 1 could not be satisfied. In order to address the issue discussed in Section IV-A, we introduce an additional constraint on γ j (j = 1, . . . , q) that all h j are constructed from the same nominal evading maneuver.
Definition 2. Suppose every h j (j = 1, . . . , q) is defined as in (9) and is constructed from γ j , respectively. The shared evading maneuver assumption holds if
Remark 4. This assumption requires that each h j (j = 1, . . . , q) be constructed from the same nominal evading maneuver. Note, however, that this does not imply that each h j must be constructed from the same safety function ρ j .
The example in Section IV-A does not satisfy the shared evading maneuver assumption because γ 1 (x) and γ 2 (x) defined in (17) are not the same. To enforce that the shared evasive maneuver assumption holds, one option is to change γ 1 so that
In other words, using γ 1 defined in (20) and γ 2 and γ 3 in (16b) implies an evasive maneuver where all vehicles turn left for each constraint. Another example where the shared nominal evading maneuver assumption holds is as follows:
In this case, γ s (x) encodes an evasive maneuver where vehicle 1 turns left with a linear velocity of 1, vehicle 2 stays straight with a linear velocity of 1.5, and vehicle 3 turns right with a linear velocity of 2. These three nominal evading maneuvers satisfy the shared evasive maneuver assumption because for all x ∈ D, γ 1 (x) = γ 2 (x) = γ 3 (x). To see the purpose of the shared evading maneuver assumption, we first examine the case of a single constraint. In particular, let h be defined in (9) and consider the role of γ in establishing that h is a ZCBF. From Definition 1, for h to be used for a barrier certificate, K h (x) must be nonempty for all x ∈ D h . With h defined as in (9), this property is satisfied by γ(x) for all x ∈ C h (see Theorem 3). The analogue condition for multiple constraints is that K ∩ (x) is non-empty for all x ∈ C ∩ . If each h j defined in (9) is a ZCBF and is constructed from γ j then by similar reasoning to Theorem 3,
for all x ∈ C ∩ then we can additionally conclude that K ∩ (x) is non-empty for all x ∈ C h j .
D. Calculating a Safe Control Law
With the shared evading maneuver assumption, we can calculate u ∈ K ∩ so that u is Lipschitz continuous. To do so, we write the QP in (6) with q constraints and let u = û
T whereû i is the nominal input of vehicle i for i = 1, . . . , k. To emphasize that all h j are constructed from γ s , we write h j (x; ρ j , γ s ) for each j = 1, . . . , q.
Theorem 4. Suppose C ∩ is defined as in (19) where h j (j = 1, . . . , q) defined in (9) is continuously differentiable and the shared evading maneuver assumption holds. In addition, suppose that h j has a Lipschitz continuous derivative for j = 1, . . . , q,û and γ s are Lipschitz continuous, γ s maps to the interior of U , and that x is in the interior of C ∩ . Then u * in (21) is Lipschitz continuous and C ∩ is forward invariant.
Proof. Under these assumptions γ s is strictly feasible so u * is Lipschitz continuous as an application of Theorem 1 of [40] . C ∩ is then forward invariant by Lemma 1.
Theorem 4 gives conditions for ensuring that for all x ∈ C ∩ , a Lipschitz continuous u ∈ K ∩ (x) can be calculated, thus resolving the issue presented in Section IV-A. A geometric view of the problem and resolution is shown in Figure 4 .
V. DECENTRALIZED CONTROL CALCULATION
The QP in (21) is a centralized calculation. In particular, it requires that each vehicle's nominal control inputû i be communicated. Frequently communicating this signal when there are many vehicles may reduce throughput for other important messages or introduce communication delays. Thus, we show how to ensure safety constraints can be satisfied by reformulating the QP so that the vehicles can calculate a safe control signal without requiring each other's nominal control input.
T . Further, assume A in (6c) is block diagonal with block entries A i for i = 1, . . . , k where A i is a m i × m i matrix. This assumption means that actuator constraints are not coupled between vehicles. For constraint j for j = 1, . . . , q, let
where 0 mi is the zero vector in R mi . ζ j represents the set of vehicles whose control input affects the time derivative of h j for some x ∈ D. We let |ζ j | denote the cardinality of ζ j , and note that for the case of pairwise collision avoidance, |ζ j | = 2 for all j = 1, . . . , q. In the example with three vehicles in Section IV, (5) . The decentralized admissible control space for constraint j (j = 1, . . . , q) and vehicle i (i ∈ ζ j ) is defined as
Let A i = {j ∈ {1, . . . , q} : i ∈ ζ j } so that A i is the set of indices where u i has an effect on the time derivative of the associated barrier certificate for some x ∈ D. For the three vehicle example of Section IV, A 1 = {1, 2}, A 2 = {1, 3}, A 3 = {2, 3}. The decentralized admissible control space for vehicle i is then K i (x) = l∈Ai K i,l and the overall decentralized admissible control space is
Theorem 5. Suppose C ∩ is defined as in (19) where h j is continuously differentiable and the shared evading maneuver assumption holds where γ s is locally Lipschitz. Then ∀x ∈ C ∩ , γ s ∈ K(x) and K(x) ⊆ K ∩ (x).
Proof. Consider the first statement, namely that γ s ∈ K(x). For j = 1, . . . , q, consider any i ∈ ζ j and let
The inequality is true because x ∈ C ∩ implies α(h j (x; ρ j , γ s )) ≥ 0. See the proof for Theorem 3 for why
For the second statement, assume u ∈ K(x) so that u i ∈ K i (x) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. This means that A i u i ≥ b i so that, because A is block diagonal, Au ≥ b. Further, it means that for any constraint j = 1, . . . , q and any i ∈ ζ j ,
To simplify (22) , note that by definition,
Using (23) in the following then yields
Summing (22) over i ∈ ζ j and using (23) and (24) yields
Since this is true for all j = 1, . . . , q, u
In particular, Theorem 5 implies that when vehicle i (for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}) calculates the following QP, the QP will be feasible for all x ∈ C ∩ , and C ∩ will be forward invariant:
Theorem 6. Under the same assumptions of Theorem 4, u * i
in (25) is Lipschitz continuous and C ∩ is forward invariant.
Proof. γ s i is strictly feasible so u * i is Lipschitz continuous as an application of Theorem 1 of [40] . Then u = u * 1
is Lipschitz continuous and because u * i ∈ K i (x), u ∈ K(x). Then by Theorem 5, u ∈ K ∩ (x) and C ∩ is forward invariant by Lemma 1.
We note that the solution from the centralized QP (21) may be different than the solution from the decentralized QPs (25) because K(x) may be a strict subset of K ∩ (x). To see this,
Since u 1 = 0 is feasible for the latter but not the former equation, we do not have that K(x) = K ∩ (x). Although the decentralized QP (25) can be used to ensure safety by Theorem 6, because K(x) ⊂ K ∩ (x), it may be that the total cost of each vehicle calculating (25) is higher than the centralized calculation (21) . In other words, the calculated safe control may not be as close to the nominal control signal in a least squares sense when using (25) as opposed to (21) .
Another difference between the decentralized (25) and the centralized (21) QPs is how the size of the optimization variable and number of constraints vary with the number of vehicles k. In the centralized approach (21) the size of the optimization variable grows linearly with k while the number of constraints grows quadratically. On the other hand, in the decentralized QP (25) , the size of the optimization variable and number of constraints are constant and linear, respectively.
VI. SIMULATION
In this section we repeat the scenario discussed in Section III-D but consider k = 20 vehicles. For the scenario where h is constructed from γ turn , we use v ω v ω T where v = 0.9v min + 0.1v max and ω = 0.9ω max . For the scenario where h is constructed from γ straight , we let γ i = (1 + 0.01i)v 0 T so that each vehicle uses a different translational velocity as is required to ensure differentiability of h (see Section III-C). Note that this does not violate the shared evading maneuver assumption because
Additionally, we let ψ = 0 and ψ = 25
• in the scenario where h is constructed from γ turn and γ straight , respectively. Offsetting the initial orientation 25
• from pointing at the origin is required so that the vehicles can start in the safe set when using γ straight . Screenshots for the case of γ turn and γ straight are shown in Figures 5  and 6 , respectively. Quantitative results for both scenarios are shown in Figure 7 which shows similar outputs to the results for the two vehicle simulation shown in Figure 2 . In particular, the pairwise distance between all vehicles are kept above the minimum safety distance D s while satisfying actuator constraints.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have examined how to ensure that for vehicles characterized by constrained inputs, multiple barrier certificates can be satisfied simultaneously while relaxing communication requirements. The resulting solution is a decentralized algorithm that was applied to a collision avoidance scenario with fixed-wing UAVs where in spite of communication restrictions, the vehicles are able to maintain safe distances from each other.
APPENDIX A PROOF FOR THEOREM 2
Proof. Starting from the definition of the derivative of h from (9), we expand terms using a Taylor series and simplify the expression using an argument by contradiction. Let ν k be a sequence in R n approaching zero,x + δx k be the trajectory starting from x(t) + ν k rather than x(t), ∂x(t+τ ) ∂x(t) the derivative of the solution at time t + τ with respect to initial conditions, and τ 1 ≥ 0 a time for which ρ(x(t + τ )) is a minimum. Note that ∂x(t+τ ) ∂x(t) is well defined by Theorem 6.1 of [41] and noting thatẋ is continuously differentiable. We start with the following: ρ(x(t + τ 1 ))
We claim that as k approaches ∞, ρ(x(t + τ 1 )) + ∂ρ(x(t + τ 1 )) ∂x(t + τ 1 )
Suppose not and let τ 2,k ≥ 0 be a time for which ρ((x + δx k )(t + τ )) is a minimum. As a first case, suppose ρ(x(t + τ 1 )) + ∂ρ(x(t+τ1)) ∂x(t+τ1) ∂x(t+τ1) ∂x(t) ν k > ρ((x + δx k )(t + τ 2,k )) + α for some α > 0. Then for large enough k, ρ(x(t + τ 1 )) + ∂ρ(x(t + τ 1 )) ∂x(t + τ 1 ) ∂x(t + τ 1 ) ∂x(t) ν k > ρ((x + δx k )(t + τ 2,k ) + α ≥ ρ(x(t + τ 2,k )) + ∂ρ(x(t + τ 2,k )) ∂x(t + τ 2,k ) ∂x(t + τ 2,k ) ∂x(t) ν k + α/2 ≥ ρ(x(t + τ 1 )) + ∂ρ(x(t + τ 2,k )) ∂x(t + τ 2,k )
The last inequality holds because τ 1 is a time for which ρ(x(t+ τ )) is a minimum so ρ(x(t+τ 1 )) ≤ ρ(x(t+τ 2,k )). Letting k → ∞, we get 0 > α/2, a contradiction. In the other case, suppose ρ(x(t+τ 1 ))+ ∂ρ(x(t+τ1)) ∂x(t+τ1) ∂x(t+τ1) ∂x(t) ν k < ρ((x+δx k )(t+τ 2,k ))− α for some α > 0. Then for large enough k, ρ((x + δx k )(t + τ 2,k )) − α/2 > ρ((x + δx k )(t + τ 1 )) > ρ((x + δx k )(t + τ 2,k )).
The second inequality holds because τ 2,k is a time for which ρ((x + δx k )(t + τ ) is a minimum. Letting k → ∞, we get −α/2 > 0, a contradiction. Then (27) holds. From (26) and (27) we then conclude that 
